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THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE OF 
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: 
A CASE STUDY OF UNIFIL
Layan Charara*
Over the course of the United Nations’ (the “UN” or the “Organiza-
tion”) history, the Organization’s arsenal for the maintenance of internation-
al peace and security has evolved substantially. The UN employs a number 
of tactics in pursuit of international cooperation, including diplomacy, 
blockades, economic sanctions, and disruptions in means of communication. 
One operation engaged by the UN since its inception is particularly contro-
versial: peacekeeping. The first UN peacekeeping contingent, the United 
Nations Emergency Force, was deployed during the 1956 Arab-Israeli con-
flict. Since then, 71 peacekeeping operations have been deployed, 14 are 
ongoing, and 3,826 peacekeeper fatalities have been reported, more than 
half of which were due to accident or malicious act.1
Using the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (“UNIFIL” or “the 
Force”) as a case study, this Note provides a treatment of the legal recourse 
available to peacekeepers injured or killed in the service of the UN. This 
Note focuses on the incident of July 25, 2006—when four UN peacekeepers 
were killed in Khiam, South Lebanon—to demonstrate that the existing le-
gal architecture insufficiently protects the rights of the UN and its peace-
keepers. UNIFIL illustrates this problem in three principal ways: (1) the sta-
tus of peacekeepers is unresolved in international law, and existing 
instruments such as the Safety Convention are not comprehensive enough; 
(2) not all parties to a conflict come within the ambit of the existing legal 
regime; and (3) UNIFIL is deeply entangled in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
which affects its ability to discharge its mandate and the international com-
munity’s ability to ensure the safety and security of UNIFIL personnel.
While UNIFIL is distinctive with respect to item (3), items (1) and (2) 
are shared by other peacekeeping missions, making all UN Member States’ 
obligation to ensure the safety and security of UN peacekeepers substantive-
ly inadequate. Accordingly, this Note explores the ways UNIFIL is a unique 
peacekeeping force that can still teach broader lessons about UN peacekeep-
* J.D., December 2018, University of Michigan Law School. My thanks go to Profes-
sor Kristina Daugirdas for her insights and feedback on earlier versions of this Note. I am also 
grateful to the editors of the Michigan Journal of International Law for their thoughtful edits. 
Finally, I am thankful for the troops of UNIFIL and their efforts to maintain peace in my 
homeland—efforts exerted at the expense of their own safety and security in a land far from 
their own.
1. Data, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data; Fa-
talities, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities (last up-
dated Feb. 28, 2019).
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ing. It is organized into four parts: Part I provides a contour of UN peace-
keeping operations; Part II chronicles the history of UNIFIL; Part III ana-
lyzes the current legal regime with respect to UN peacekeeping; and Part IV 
surveys solutions offered in the past and recommends more apposite courses 
of action to strengthen the legal recourse available to peacekeepers and their 
families.
I.  United Nations Peacekeeping at a Glance
Peacekeeping operations are not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the 
UN Charter (the “Charter”).2 As such, scholars and practitioners struggle to 
reach consensus on the definition of such operations. Former Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacekeeping as
the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto 
the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United 
Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as 
well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for 
both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.3
The deployment of peacekeeping operations is widely understood as an 
exercise of the Security Council’s primary responsibility for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security.4 The Security Council fulfils this 
responsibility by enacting measures pursuant to Charter Chapters VI and 
VII, which provide for the pacific settlement of disputes and enforcement 
actions respectively. Although Security Council resolutions on peacekeep-
ing operations typically cite Chapter VI or VII as the legal basis for their es-
tablishment, it is often contended that peacekeeping developed in the gray 
zone between these two chapters, making its precise place in the Charter 
difficult to locate.5 In recent years, however, peacekeeping missions have 
been expressly deployed as Chapter VII operations.6 The UN maintains that 
2. ROBERT C.R. SIEKMANN, NATIONAL CONTINGENTS IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE-
KEEPING FORCES 4–5 (1991).
3. Michael Bothe & Thomas Dörschel, The UN Peacekeeping Experience, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF VISITING FORCES 487, 487 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2001).
4. U.N. Charter art. 24.
5. Members of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping called for the addition of a 
chapter between VI and VII on peacekeeping. The proposal has yet to gain serious traction. 
RAMESH THAKUR, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN LEBANON: UNITED NATIONS 
AUTHORITY AND MULTINATIONAL FORCE 21, 29 (1987). Peacekeeping has instead been re-
ferred to as a “Chapter VI and a half” operation, a term first coined by former Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjöld. 60 Years of United Nations Peacekeeping, UNITED NATIONS 
PEACEKEEPING, http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2008/60years.shtml (last visit-
ed Mar. 28, 2019).
6. Mandates and the Legal Basis for Peacekeeping, UNITED NATIONS 
PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mandates-and-legal-basis-peacekeeping (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2019).
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invocation of Chapter VII serves as a “means of reminding the parties to a 
conflict and the wider UN membership of their obligation to give effect to 
Security Council decisions.”7 The UN also attributes peacekeeping opera-
tions to Article 29 of the Charter, which grants the Security Council the 
power to establish subsidiary organs it deems necessary for the performance 
of its functions.8
UN peacekeeping comprises two distinct types of operations known as 
“first generation” traditional peacekeeping, intended to end interstate con-
flict, and “second generation” peacekeeping, which entails expanded man-
dates that seek to maintain intrastate peace.9 In the absence of clear guid-
ance from the Charter, the rules of peacekeeping developed ad hoc over the 
years and culminated in three basic principles: consent of the parties, impar-
tiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the force’s 
mandate.10
Consent. Consent of the parties to the conflict is necessary to provide 
peacekeeping forces with freedom of action to fulfil their mandates. Ab-
sence of consent risks entangling forces as parties to conflicts.11 Further-
more, should any complications arise, “the [consent] of the host state consti-
tutes an element of a contractual relationship between the United Nations 
and the host state. Thus, rights and duties of the United Nations may be de-
rived from that consent.”12
Consent is typically manifested in the form of a status of forces agree-
ment (“SOFA”).13 SOFAs are critical legal instruments that define the rela-
tionship between a UN peacekeeping force and its host state and guarantee 
the legality of a peacekeeping force’s presence in a country’s territory.14
Their importance for peacekeeping operations is evinced by the UN’s 
promulgation of a model SOFA that is intended to be used provisionally un-
til a more tailored one is negotiated.15
In the interstate context, when a peacekeeping force acts as a buffer, 
“not only the host state but also its adversary, a neighbouring country, must 
have given its consent to this before there can be any question of peace-
7. Id.
8. The General Assembly may also establish peacekeeping missions. SIEKMANN, su-
pra note 2, at 126.
9. CHEN KERTCHER, THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING, 1988–95, at 1–5
(2016).
10. Principles of Peacekeeping, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, 
http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
11. Id.
12. Bothe & Dörschel, supra note 3, at 492.
13. Discussed further infra Part III.
14. Id. at 491; RAY MURPHY, UN PEACEKEEPING IN LEBANON, SOMALIA AND 
KOSOVO: OPERATIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN PRACTICE 7 (2007).
15. Annex F: Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations (UN 
Model SOFA), in THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF VISITING FORCES, supra note 3, at 603.
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keeping.”16 This consent does not, however, guarantee cooperation with or 
the safety of peacekeeping forces.17 Often, adversarial or neighboring coun-
tries’ interference in a peacekeeping force’s ability to fulfil its mandate un-
dermines any tacit consent they may provide for its deployment.18
Impartiality. The UN understands impartiality in peacekeeping as
an objective and consistent execution of the mandate, regardless of 
provocation or challenge. Impartiality does not mean inaction or 
overlooking violations. UN peacekeepers should be impartial in 
their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the 
execution of their mandate, i.e., they must actively pursue the im-
plementation of their mandate even if doing so goes against the in-
terests of one or more of the parties.19
Impartiality is demanded by the fact that peacekeeping forces must stand 
between warring parties and remain credible in order to achieve their man-
date.20 One party’s distrust of a peacekeeping force can frustrate its entire 
mission.21
Self-Defense and Defense of the Mandate. UN peacekeeping operations 
are usually not enforcement tools. However, the Security Council occasion-
ally confers “robust” mandates, which authorize the use of force in self-
defense and in defense of the mandate should certain parties attempt to 
thwart its execution.22 The UN asserts that robust peacekeeping should not 
be confused with Chapter VII peace enforcement; “[r]obust peacekeeping 
involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the 
Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to 
the conflict,” whereas peace enforcement does not require consent and may 
involve greater military force.23
II.  The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
In the context of Arab-Israeli peacekeeping operations, agreement on a 
mandate does not translate into agreement on perceptions and expectations 
vis-à-vis peacekeeping forces.24 This issue came to the fore when UNIFIL
16. SIEKMANN, supra note 2, at 6.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Section III(B).
19. UNITED NATIONS, HANDBOOK ON UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL 
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 56 (2003).
20. Mandates and the Legal Basis for Peacekeeping, supra note 6.
21. See infra Part II.
22. UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: PRINCIPLES 
AND GUIDELINES 19 (2008). The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (“UNIFIL”) is an 
example of a force with this kind of mandate.
23. Id. at 34. 
24. NATHAN A. PELCOVITS, PEACEKEEPING ON ARAB-ISRAELI FRONTS 17 (1984).
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was established in 1978, following Israel’s invasion of South Lebanon. 
UNIFIL’s original mandate in March 1978, codified in Security Council 
Resolution 425, was to “confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern 
Lebanon, restore international peace and security, [and] assist the Govern-
ment of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the ar-
ea.”25 Its mandate was expanded by the Security Council following the 2006 
Lebanon War to monitor the cessation of hostilities, ensure the withdrawal 
of Israeli forces from Lebanon, assist in securing the Lebanese border, and 
ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance.26
UNIFIL was deployed in the midst of two diverging conflicts whose 
parties often converged—the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which South Lebanon 
has long been an active front, and the Lebanese Civil War, raging intermit-
tently from 1975 until its conclusion in 1990. The two conflicts intersected 
at the question of Palestine due to the presence of hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, many of whom took up arms on behalf of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (the “PLO”) and turned South Leba-
non into a base from which to launch attacks at Israel.27 Consequently, Leb-
anon became a target of violent Israeli retaliation, which culminated in Isra-
el’s invasion of South Lebanon in 1978 and 1982.28
Lebanese and Israeli opinions of UNIFIL diverged. The Lebanese gov-
ernment—to the extent it existed in the midst of the civil war—welcomed 
the establishment of UNIFIL as it sought to distance itself from Palestinian 
attacks on Israel and wanted Israeli forces out of its territory.29 The Israelis, 
on the other hand, sought to thwart and humiliate UNIFIL from the outset, 
for they felt the Force was imposed on them without their case being 
heard.30 They considered Resolution 425 “inadequate and sorely lacking” 
because it did not explicitly ban “terrorists”—that is, the PLO—from return-
ing to Lebanon.31 As such, the Israeli government maintained that its inva-
sion of Lebanon was in self-defense due to PLO attacks and consistently 
frustrated UNIFIL’s goals.32
Throughout the Lebanese Civil War, UNIFIL was the greatest threat to 
Israel’s goals of crushing Palestinian resistance and installing a friendlier 
Lebanese government.33 The Security Council recognized that Israel was the 
foremost obstacle to achieving UNIFIL’s mandate, “deplor[ing],” in Resolu-
25. UNIFIL Mandate, UNIFIL, https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-mandate (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2019).
26. Id.
27. Karim Makdisi, Reconsidering the Struggle over UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, 43 
J. PALESTINE STUD. 24, 24–25 (2014).
28. ANTHONY VERRIER, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 126 (1981).
29. Makdisi, supra note 27, at 27–28.
30. VERRIER, supra note 28, at 118; PELCOVITS, supra note 24, at 18.
31. Makdisi, supra note 27, at 29–30.
32. Id. at 29.
33. Id. at 32.
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tion 444, Israel’s lack of cooperation with UNIFIL and its assistance to 
armed groups in the South.34 Trust and confidence in UN peacekeeping 
forces by local parties are crucial for their success; persistent Israeli suspi-
cions and bombardment were—and continue to be—a significant threat to 
UNIFIL’s mandate.35
Although Israel formally withdrew from South Lebanon in 2000, ten-
sions continue to simmer at the Lebanese-Israeli border and threaten to ma-
terialize into conflict. Between 1978, the year of UNIFIL’s establishment, 
and the time of writing, 313 UNIFIL fatalities were reported—the most of 
any UN peacekeeping mission.36 A number of these fatalities are attributable 
to Israel, in addition to the armed groups previously present in South Leba-
non.37 Should another conflict between Lebanon and Israel take place, 
peacekeepers will once again be in the line of fire.38
The remainder of this Note focuses on one particular incident during the 
2006 Lebanon War—that of July 25, when four unarmed UN peacekeepers 
were killed during an Israeli airstrike on a UN observation post in Khiam, 
South Lebanon.39 According to accounts of the incident, an Israeli F-16 
fighter jet dropped a 1,000-pound bomb directly onto the UN compound in 
Khiam.40 Journalistic reports describe the UN position as displaying clear 
UN markings, including waving the UN flag outside the compound.41 Ac-
cording to the UNIFIL press release following the incident, there were 14 
prior incidents of firing by Israeli forces close to this position.42 The 
34. Id.
35. THAKUR, supra note 5, at 59.
36. Fatalities, supra note 1.
37. See MURPHY, supra note 14, at 309.
38. Even during times of relative peace between Lebanon and Israel, peacekeepers are 
still in danger. For example, a Spanish peacekeeper was killed by Israeli fire in 2015, although 
Israel asserts it was not intentional. Israel Admits Its Fire Killed Spanish UN Peacekeeper,
BBC (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32206393.
39. The four observers killed in the airstrike were UN Military Observers, part of the 
UN Observer Group Lebanon (the “OGL”). The OGL supports UNIFIL, operates out of 
UNIFIL bases, and patrols along the “Blue Line” with UNIFIL. They are tasked with observ-
ing and reporting violations of agreements of ceasefire and disengagement. In its discussions 
of this incident, the Security Council refers to the military observers killed as UNIFIL peace-
keepers. For the purposes of consistency, and given the nature of the OGL’s activities, this
Note adopts this terminology. UNTSO Operations, UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION 
ORG., https://untso.unmissions.org/untso-operations (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
40. Robert Fisk, It Is 10 Years Since UN Peacekeepers Were killed in Southern Leba-
non – and it Could Happen Again Now, INDEPENDENT, https://www.independent.co.uk/
voices/it-is-10-years-since-un-peacekeepers-were-killed-in-southern-lebanon-and-it-could-
happen-again-now-a7154571.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2019); Rory McCarthy, Suzanne 
Goldberg, & Oliver Burkeman, Israelis Ignored Repeated Warnings Before Killing UN Ob-
servers, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2006, 9:11 PM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2006/jul/27/syria.israel4.
41. E.g., Fisk, supra note 40; McCarthy, Goldberg, & Burkeman, supra note 40.
42. Press Release, UNIFIL
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UNIFIL Force Commander “was in repeated contact with Israeli Army of-
ficers throughout the afternoon, pressing the need to protect that particular 
UN position from firing.”43 Journalists and Commandant Kevin McDonald, 
an Irish officer serving in UNIFIL at the time, similarly reported that UN 
officers repeatedly pleaded with Israel to cease fire, and Israel offered false 
assurances.44 A UN officer speculated—anonymously—that Israel may have 
sought to prevent the UN observers from reporting on its activities in that 
area as Khiam was a strategic location from which to maneuver armor into 
Lebanon.45
Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the incident as an “apparently 
deliberate targeting” of a clearly marked UN observer post by Israel.46 Israel 
refused UN participation in the investigation into the incident, asserting it 
was an error and that it would “never intentionally target any UN facility or 
personnel.”47 Israeli authorities accepted full responsibility for what they de-
termined was an “operational level” mistake.48 Secretary-General Annan 
lamented that the UN Board of Inquiry “did not have access to operational 
or tactical level IDF commanders involved in the incident,” resulting in the 
Board’s failure to determine what exactly happened and “why the attacks on 
the UN position were not halted, despite repeated demarches to the Israeli 
authorities . . . .”49
The Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, tasked with investigating the 
2006 Lebanon War, ultimately concluded that there was no justification for 
(July 26, 2006), https://unifil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/pr010.377fa8e7-
80e2-4249-b26f-95b578aa6d3a.pdf; see also Kevin Mc Donald, Peacekeeping on the Edge: 
Observer Group Lebanon and the 2006 Israel – Lebanon War, https://www.academia.edu/
27311015/PEACEKEEPING_ON_THE_EDGE (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
43. Press Release, UNIFIL (July 26, 2006), supra note 42; see also Warren Hoge, U.N. 
Says It Protested to Israel for 6 Hours During Attack That Killed 4 Observers in Lebanon,
N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/27/world/middleeast/
27nations.html.
44. Fisk, supra note 40; Mc Donald, supra note 42.
45. Fisk, supra note 40.
46. Annan “Shocked:” by Israeli Attack on UN Lebanon Post that Killed at least 2, UN
NEWS (July 25, 2006), https://news.un.org/en/story/2006/07/186862-annan-shocked-israeli-
attack-un-lebanon-post-killed-least-2.
47. Israeli Responses to Accidental Killing of Four UNIFIL soldiers, ISR. MINISTRY 
FOREIGN AFF. (July 26, 2006), http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2006/pages/
israeli%20responses%20to%20accidental%20killing%20of%20four%20unifil%20soldiers%
2026-jul-2006.aspx.
48. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Comm’n of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to 
Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1*, ¶¶ 233–43, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/3/2 (Nov. 23, 2006).
49. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHY THEY DIED: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN LEBANON 
DURING THE 2006 WAR 115 (2007), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
lebanon0907.pdf; Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Receives Report on 
Attack that Killed Observers at Khiam, Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/10666 (Sept. 29, 
2006).
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this direct attack—or any other attack—on UN personnel during the war.50
Due to these events, the UN was compelled to relocate peacekeeping per-
sonnel in South Lebanon “as potential threats to the unarmed military ob-
servers [could] no longer be mitigated by other means.”51 This incident 
sheds light on the three principal shortcomings of the UN peacekeeping re-
gime and demonstrates the nature of the attacks UNIFIL personnel endure 
and what recourse is available.52
III.  Legal Recourse Available to Peacekeepers
The legal framework of UN peacekeeping is usually comprised of a Se-
curity Council or General Assembly resolution establishing the force, a 
SOFA or Status of Mission Agreement, agreements between the troop-
contributing states and the UN, and regulations for the force issued by the 
Secretary-General.53 However, peacekeeping operations do not exist in a 
vacuum. On the contrary, they implicate the broader framework of interna-
tional law by virtue of being stationed in conflict zones and products of in-
ternational relations and diplomacy.
The following sections analyze the international legal regimes that offer 
recourse to peacekeepers, paying special attention to Israel’s status as a state 
party to the conflict. As discussed in Part II, a number of parties complicat-
ed UNIFIL’s mission, including non-state actors like the PLO and Hizbal-
lah. Their involvement notwithstanding, the legal issues considered below 
will primarily account for the states that are recognized subjects of interna-
tional law and not the non-state actors whose status in the international legal 
framework is currently unsettled. While the current architecture offers a 
number of hypothetical avenues for relief, the circumstances of this particu-
lar case make provision of reparations particularly challenging, as will be 
demonstrated in the following sections.
A. The UN Charter
1. Member States’ Obligations
The Charter of the UN sets out the purposes of the establishment of the 
Organization in Chapter I. These purposes include maintaining international 
peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations, achieving 
international cooperation to solve international problems, encouraging re-
spect for human rights, and harmonizing the fulfilment of these purposes.54
50. Human Rights Council, supra note 48, ¶ 19.
51. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated 29 July 2006 from the Secretary-General ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/595 (July 29, 2006).
52. See supra pp. 1–2.
53. MURPHY, supra note 14, at 309.
54. U.N. Charter art. 1.
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The Charter stipulates that Member States must fulfil the obligations en-
shrined in the Charter in good faith and that they must refrain from endan-
gering international peace and security.55
The Security Council discharges its duty to maintain international peace 
and security in accordance with Charter Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.56
Peacekeeping operations are established pursuant to the Security Council’s 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security. As such, peace-
keeping operations are carried out in accordance with the Purposes and 
Principles of the UN.57
Member States are obligated to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council, in addition to providing the UN with assistance for any 
action it takes in accordance with the Charter.58 In other words, Member 
States have a legal obligation to ensure that they do not impede the Security 
Council’s actions or endanger the peace and security the Council endeavors 
to maintain.59 Although the Charter does not expressly obligate Member 
States not to thwart the Security Council, the obligations to act in accord-
ance with the Principles of the Organization and to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council arguably entail an obligation not to act in 
contravention of these said Principles and decisions.60 In the peacekeeping 
context, this means that attacks on peacekeepers may be construed as a 
breach of an obligation under the UN Charter—an act that is a violation of 
international law with legal consequences. Who may bring a claim for such 
a violation is a more difficult question.
2. The UN as Applicant
In theory, the UN may raise a claim against a state that inflicts harm or 
damage on its property or agents, including peacekeepers. In the Reparation 
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations case, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (the “ICJ”) held that the UN is an international per-
son that is “a subject of international law and capable of possessing interna-
tional rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by 
bringing international claims.”61 The court went on to say,
in the event of an agent of the United Nations in the performance of 
his duties suffering injury in circumstances involving the responsi-
bility of a Member State, the United Nations as an Organization has
the capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible 
55. U.N. Charter art. 2.
56. U.N. Charter art. 24.
57. See U.N. Charter arts. 1, 24, ¶ 2.
58. U.N. Charter arts. 2, ¶ 5, 25.
59. See U.N. Charter arts. 2, ¶ 3, 25.
60. See U.N. Charter arts. 2, ¶ 3, 25. 
61. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174, 179 (Apr. 11).
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de jure or de facto government with a view to obtaining the repara-
tion due in respect of the damage caused to the United Nations. . . .
[And,] the reparation due in respect of the damage caused to the 
victim or to persons entitled through him.62
The court further held that, when the UN is bringing such a claim for dam-
ages caused to its agent, “it can only do so by basing its claim upon a breach 
of obligations due to itself . . . .”63
The Court assumed that the breached obligation due to the UN in this 
case is the obligation to “protect the agents of the Organization in the per-
formance of their duties.”64 In its discussion, the Court stresses that the par-
ticular damage at issue is “damage caused to the interests of the Organiza-
tion itself, to its administrative machine, to its property and assets, and to 
the interests of which it is the guardian.”65 Causing such damage, according 
to the Court, constitutes a breach of an international obligation “designed to 
help an agent of the Organization in the performance of his duties.”66 The 
Court links this obligation to Article 2(5) of the UN Charter, which requires 
Member States to “give the United Nations every assistance in any action it 
takes in accordance with the present Charter . . . .”67 This obligation argua-
bly encompasses a duty not to endanger agents of the Organization in the 
performance of their duties—discharged pursuant to the UN Charter—or to 
thwart their ability to effectively perform their duties, in addition to affirma-
tively protecting them in the performance of their duties.68
The UN may invoke a right due to it and ask for reparation on the basis 
that “it is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement 
involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form . . . .”69 Fol-
lowing the ICJ’s Reparations opinion, General Assembly Resolution 365 
(IV) authorized the Secretary-General to bring an international claim against 
the government of a state that is alleged to have caused damage to the UN 
and in respect of the injury caused to the victim.70 Thus, if peacekeepers are 
classified as UN agents—acting in the interest of the Organization and pur-
suant to its Charter—then the UN can bring claims on their behalf as de-
scribed in the Reparations case and pursuant to Resolution 365. That is, the 
UN has the legal capacity to bring a claim against Israel for the injury and 
62. Id. at 187.
63. Id. at 188.
64. Id. at 177.
65. Id. at 180.
66. Id. at 180, 182.
67. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 5.
68. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 
I.C.J. Rep. at 183.
69. Id. at 184.
70. G.A. Res. 365 (IV) (Dec. 1, 1949).
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death of its peacekeepers because they are agents of the Organization that 
Israel is obligated to protect.
Peacekeeping missions are deployed pursuant to the provisions of the 
UN Charter. The UN deploys these missions as a guardian of the interests of 
international peace and security. As a Member State of the UN, Israel is ob-
ligated to carry out the Security Council’s decisions and refrain from en-
dangering international peace and security.71 If the July 25 attack on 
UNIFIL was deliberate, then Israel violated its international obligations un-
der the UN Charter by targeting peacekeepers whose very objective is to re-
store peace and security. Raising a claim under Israel’s account of the 
events—namely, that it was an accident—is also plausible given Israel’s ob-
ligation to protect agents of the UN in the performance of their duties.72
The UN has in fact brought claims against Member States in instances 
where a government is accused of injuring UN staff in the course of peace-
keeping missions.73 Unfortunately, “[t]he great majority of these claims 
were not settled and the States did not agree to arbitration.”74 Additionally,
there are political considerations the UN must account for when Israel is 
concerned—most significantly, the United States’ unwavering support for 
its ally. While the Security Council may request an advisory opinion from 
the ICJ on the legality of Israel’s actions with respect to UNIFIL, the United 
States would likely use its veto power in the Security Council to prevent 
such an action.75 The General Assembly may find more support for such a 
request, but the ICJ’s advisory opinions carry no binding force and cannot 
compel Israel to take any action.76
In the Reparations case, the ICJ also reaffirmed that a state has the ca-
pacity to bring an international claim against another state for damages suf-
fered by its nationals.77 The opinion does not preclude the possibility of 
concurrent claims by the agent’s national state and the UN. In fact, the 
Court acknowledges that the interests of both the national state and the Or-
ganization may be engaged, although their claims may arise under different 
bases.78 Neither the national state nor the Organization has priority over the 
claim, but the ICJ maintains that the parties should cooperate to find a prac-
71. U.N. Charter arts. 24–25.
72. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 
I.C.J. Rep. at 177.
73. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Claims Against International Organizations: Quis cus-
todiet ipsos custodes, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 131, 148 (1981).
74. Id.
75. The UN itself cannot be party to a contentious case before the ICJ. Statute of the 
International Court of Justice arts. 34, ¶ 1, 65, June 26, 1945, 3 U.S.T. 1153.
76. Advisory Jurisdiction, INT’L CT. JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/advisory-
jurisdiction (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
77. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 
Rep. at 177.
78. Id. at 185.
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tical solution.79 Accordingly, the national states of injured or killed UN 
peacekeepers may coordinate with the UN to bring an international claim 
against another state, or they may pursue international claims on their own 
if the UN’s political concerns cannot tolerate raising such a claim. However, 
in the context of performing duties as an agent of the UN, it is preferable for 
the UN itself to guarantee its agent protection rather than his/her own state 
in order to ensure the agent’s independent action.80 Furthermore, as illustrat-
ed later in this Note, a peacekeeper’s national state raising a claim against 
Israel proved nearly impossible given Israel’s lack of cooperation in the 
case of the four UN observers.81
B. Status of Forces Agreements
SOFAs are typically concluded as bilateral agreements between the UN 
and the country hosting UN peacekeeping forces. They are a staple in UN 
peacekeeping operations as they secure the legality of a peacekeeping 
force’s presence in its host country’s territory.82 SOFAs outline the rights 
and duties of peacekeeping forces, and their substance is negotiated with the 
host state in order to ensure forces can carry out their mandates in their area 
of operation without undue influence.83 These agreements define the privi-
leges and immunities of UN forces, ensure freedom of movement for peace-
keepers, guarantee facilities for forces, and provide dispute settlement 
mechanisms among other arrangements.84
Ideally, SOFAs should be signed prior to the deployment of a peace-
keeping force, but, given that peacekeeping operations are often assembled 
in haste, this is not always possible.85 In fact, UNIFIL operated without a 
SOFA for 20 years. Consequently, the Force was left to rely on precarious 
assurances that a Lebanese government at war—without effective control of 
UNIFIL’s area of operation and within the greater context of the question of 
Palestine—would uphold a gentlemen’s agreement, respect the UN’s privi-
leges and immunities, and ensure the safety of its peacekeepers. Allegiance 
to a gentlemen’s agreement is contingent upon whether a party derives any 
benefit from compliance with it, so respect for UNIFIL’s authority and 
rights was not always guaranteed prior to the SOFA’s conclusion.86 Moreo-
79. Id. at 185–86.
80. Id. at 183–84.
81. See infra Section IV(B).
82. Bothe & Dörschel, supra note 3, at 491.
83. MURPHY, supra note 14, at 108.
84. E.g., Annex F: Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations 
(UN Model SOFA), supra note 15, at 603.
85. MURPHY, supra note 14, at 108.
86. Id. at 111; There are, of course, other protections within the frameworks of interna-
tional human rights law and international humanitarian law that provide peacekeepers with 
protections, whether a SOFA is in place or not, and they are discussed infra Sections III(C)–
(E).
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ver, because SOFAs are usually bilateral agreements, Israel is outside the 
scope of the obligations enshrined in the Lebanon-UN agreement, leaving 
peacekeepers without similar recourse against one of the parties to the con-
flict.
Prior to the adoption of the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United 
Nations and Associated Personnel (the “Safety Convention”),87 the absence 
of a SOFA left peacekeepers in a vulnerable position insofar as their legal 
status was concerned. The nature SOFAs take on in conflict situations is pe-
culiar, as is demonstrated by the case of UNIFIL. Traditional peacekeeping 
forces are deployed to temper hostilities between distinct parties, and such 
deployment necessitates the involvement of more than one party. And yet, a 
SOFA is only signed by the UN and the host government. This certainly 
makes sense with respect to the fact that the forces are only present in the 
host country, but SOFAs include additional obligations that should be en-
forced against other parties to the conflict as well.
The SOFA between Lebanon and the UN establishes a reciprocal obli-
gation to treat one another and undertake operations “with full respect for 
the principles and spirit of the general international conventions applicable 
to the treatment of military and civilian personnel[,]” including the Four 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.88 Additionally, Chapter 
VII of the UNIFIL SOFA provides mechanisms to settle disputes and claims 
of a private law character.89 Due to Israel’s 1978 and 1982 invasions of 
Lebanon, UNIFIL was compelled to monitor the behavior of this “third par-
ty” as part of its de facto mission.90 Given the reality of the situation con-
fronted by UNIFIL and the Secretariat’s knowledge of the facts on the 
ground, the UN should have made more concerted efforts to insure its forces 
in South Lebanon vis-à-vis Israeli hostility by means of a similar agreement 
with Israel.91
Political circumstances, however, dictated otherwise. Israeli hostility to 
UNIFIL was evident prior to its deployment,92 so the suggestion of a multi-
lateral SOFA between the UN, Lebanon, and Israel or a bilateral agreement 
between the UN and Israel was likely out of the question. Furthermore, Isra-
el is generally skeptical of the UN and often uncooperative, as was the case 
when the four observers were killed. Ultimately, it may not be viable to 
conclude multilateral SOFAs for all peacekeeping missions, but it is an op-
tion worth pursuing as it will bolster the legal protections for peacekeepers 
caught between enemy lines and expressly obligate states parties to comply 
with such legal obligations.
87. See infra Section III(D) for further discussion of this treaty.
88. Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, Leb.-
U.N., art. 7(a)–(b), Dec. 15, 1995, 1901 U.N.T.S. 397.
89. Id. ch. VII.
90. MURPHY, supra note 14, at 249–50.
91. Makdisi, supra note 27, at 31.
92. See infra Part II.
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C. The Law of Armed Conflict
International humanitarian law (“IHL”), also known as the law of 
armed conflict, regulates the conduct of hostilities in armed conflicts.93 It is 
codified in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. The 
Conventions and Protocols endeavor to protect those who are not participat-
ing in hostilities—namely, civilians, health and aid workers, and those who 
have ceased participation in hostilities.94 The Geneva Conventions enjoy 
widespread ratification. Lebanon is party to Conventions I–IV and Protocols 
I and II, and Israel is party to Conventions I–IV and Protocol III.95 A num-
ber of principles of IHL are enshrined in customary international law as 
well.
It is clear that when UN forces become engaged in hostilities, they 
come within the purview of the law of armed conflict as combatants, and the 
Geneva Conventions apply to them with equal force as is applied to national 
troop contingents.96 However, the rights owed to UN forces not participating 
in hostilities under IHL are not entirely settled because the framework’s 
subject is the combatant/participant, not the peacekeeper.97
Protocol I provides that attacks on peacekeeping units, civilian person-
nel, and their property do not constitute military objectives and would thus 
be unlawful if conducted by a party to an international armed conflict.98 Ar-
ticle 37(1)(d) of Protocol I prohibits “[t]he feigning of protected status by 
the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or 
other States not Parties to the conflict.”99 One interpretation of this provision 
is that it “clearly envisages that the United Nations, and, by extension, U.N. 
personnel, have some kind of ‘protected status,’ but the nature of that status 
and the rights and obligations which flow from it are not set out in the Pro-
tocol.”100 Although Lebanon is party to Protocol I, Israel is not. Thus, these 
provisions are of no avail to UNIFIL unless they are crystallized in custom-
ary international law.
93. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols, INT’L 
COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-
conventions-1949-additional-protocols.
94. Id.
95. Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp (last visited Mar. 28, 
2019).
96. Christopher Greenwood, Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime, 7 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 185, 188–89 (1996).
97. See generally id. (describing the Geneva Conventions’ inapplicability to certain 
situations UN peacekeepers operate in).
98. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) arts. 48, 50–52, June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
99. Id. art. 37, ¶ 1(d).
100. Greenwood, supra note 96, at 190.
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There is a debate as to whether peacekeepers are “protected persons” 
under Geneva Convention IV, defined as “those who, at a given moment 
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or oc-
cupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of 
which they are not nationals.”101 The subsequent provision of the Conven-
tion excludes nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention and 
nationals of a neutral State that has diplomatic relations with the State into 
whose hands the nationals of the neutral state have fallen.102 It is argued that, 
because UN contingents are typically drawn from countries that have dip-
lomatic relations with the parties to the conflict, they do not constitute pro-
tected persons.103
Given that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the 
“ICC”) declares intentionally targeting UN peacekeepers a war crime—and 
thus, there is theoretically a venue for bringing such claims under IHL—
there may not be a great deal of utility to a debate on whether peacekeepers 
should or do have protected status under the Geneva Conventions.104 How-
ever, because neither Lebanon nor Israel is party to the Rome Statute, this is 
not a viable avenue for recourse.105 It is also worth noting that IHL’s obliga-
tion not to target peacekeepers is ineffective considering the rise in attacks 
on UN peacekeeping missions.106 Rather than impose negative obligations in 
this context, the international legal regime should obligate states to affirma-
tively protect and ensure the safety of UN peacekeepers, which the Safety 
Convention purports to do.107
D.  The 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel
The 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel was adopted in haste after statistics collected by the UN Secretar-
iat indicated peacekeepers and other UN personnel were being targeted and 
101. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
102. Id.
103. Greenwood, supra note 96, at 193.
104. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(iii), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
105. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome
%20statute.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
106. See CARLOS ALBERTO DOS SANTOS CRUZ, IMPROVING SECURITY OF UNITED 




107. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel arts. 7, 11, 
opened for signature Dec. 15, 1994, 2051 U.N.T.S. 363.
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killed at alarming rates.108 The Safety Convention purports to criminalize 
attacks on peacekeeping troops under two circumstances. The first is when 
they participate in operations established for the purpose of maintaining or 
restoring international peace and security, and the second is when the Secu-
rity Council or General Assembly declares there exists an “exceptional risk 
to the safety of the personnel participating in the operation . . . .”109 The 
Convention protects “United Nations personnel,” meaning “[p]ersons en-
gaged or deployed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as mem-
bers of the military, police or civilian components of a United Nations oper-
ation,” and “[a]ssociated personnel,” who are not under UN control.110
A treaty distinct from the Geneva Conventions was needed because the 
laws of war do not encompass protections for non-combatants undertaking 
traditional peacekeeping operations.111 Forces deployed by the UN for en-
forcement actions under Chapter VII are, however, covered by the laws of 
war.112 This distinction resulted in Article 2(2) of the Safety Convention, 
which provides that
[t]his Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation au-
thorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of 
the personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed 
forces and to which the law of international armed conflict ap-
plies.113
The use of force by peacekeepers not engaged in enforcement actions in iso-
lated cases, without sustained fighting, does not preclude application of the
Safety Convention, for they are still not engaged as combatants in such an 
instance.114
Article 4 of the Safety Convention requires host states and the UN to 
conclude SOFAs.115 Acts criminalized by the Convention are set out in Arti-
cle 9 with the caveat that they must be intentionally commissioned.116 Arti-
cle 10 requires States Parties to the Convention to establish their jurisdiction 
108. Evan T. Bloom, Protecting Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety of United 
Nations and Associated Personnel, 89 AMERICAN J. INT’L L. 621, 621–22 (1995).
109. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note 
107, art. 1(c).
110. Id. art. 1(a)–(b).
111. Bloom, supra note 108, at 624.
112. See supra p. 5 for a brief discussion of Chapter VII enforcement actions.
113. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note 
107, art. 2, ¶ 2.
114. Bloom, supra note 108, at 625.
115. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note 
107, art. 4.
116. Id. art. 9. The criminal acts include murder, kidnapping, violent attack, threat to 
commit such attacks, and attempts to commit such attacks.
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over the crimes outlined in Article 9 when the crime is committed in their 
territory or when the alleged offender is a national of that State.117 Article 13 
provides measures to ensure extradition or prosecution of the offender.118
The Safety Convention entered into force in 1999. Lebanon ratified the 
Convention in 2003, 25 years after the establishment of UNIFIL. Israel is 
neither a signatory nor a party to the Convention. Hardly any host states are 
currently parties to the Convention; in fact, only three of fourteen host states 
are parties.119 Given that the UN is unlikely to abandon peacekeeping any-
time soon, and 14 peacekeeping operations are ongoing, the Organization 
must deploy greater efforts to ensure widespread ratification of such an im-
portant treaty.
If Israel was party to the Safety Convention, the peacekeepers killed 
during the 2006 conflict would hypothetically have an avenue of legal re-
course. As persons engaged in one of the enumerated capacities in Article 1 
of the Convention, they fall under the “UN personnel” category. A claim 
could have been brought by the states that may establish jurisdiction over 
the crime pursuant to Article 10 of the Convention—that is, Lebanon or Is-
rael. One way that Lebanon could have proceeded in such an instance is by 
grounding its complaint in Articles 7 and 11 of the Convention, which im-
pose a duty on States Parties to ensure the safety and security of UN per-
sonnel and to prevent crimes against UN personnel.120 A direct attack on a 
peacekeeping operation is a violation of these articles. Israel would then be 
obligated to extradite the culprit to Lebanon for prosecution pursuant to Ar-
ticles 13 and 15 or to prosecute the culprit itself pursuant to Article 14.121
This sequence of events, however, is impossible to imagine in reality. 
Israel and Lebanon are technically still at war. They have been adversaries 
since the establishment of the State of Israel. There can be no mutual assis-
tance as envisioned by Article 16 of the Convention or any kind of coopera-
tion conceived by the Convention in its entirety. It is unimaginable that Is-
rael would extradite the culprit of the 2006 attacks to Lebanon given that the 
IDF were engaged in a war against Lebanon. Israel’s assertion that the inci-
dent was a mistake can also be read as an indication that it would not prose-
cute the individual(s) in its own courts. In other words, actions taken by the 
117. Id. art. 10.
118. Id. art. 13.
119. Dieter Fleck, The Legal Status of Personnel Involved in United Nations Peace Op-
erations, 95 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 613, 627 (2013); 8. Convention on the Safety of United 
Nations and Associated Personnel, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-8&chapter=18&clang=_en, (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2019).
120. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note 
107, arts. 7, 11.
121. Israel arguably could accomplish this absent the need for the Safety Convention 
based on its own regulations for its troops’ conduct if it so desired. However, this space for 
state discretion may explain why a treaty or more expansive obligations for the international 
community as a whole are needed.
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IDF in Lebanon in 2006—deliberate or not—are unlikely to be punished.122
This illustrates perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the Safety Convention 
and the international legal architecture of peacekeeping in general—it does 
not contemplate the obstacles posed by states hostile to one another.
While universal ratification of the Safety Convention is of the utmost 
importance, it is still a flawed instrument. It is a product of rushed negotia-
tions, and even its Optional Protocol fails to account for the legal and logis-
tical issues that may thwart its effectiveness.123 One solution may be to ne-
gotiate an additional protocol that provides for third-party facilitation of 
dispute settlement, which would narrow states’ discretionary space.124 In 
contentious cases like this, it may be more appropriate for the UN to bring a 
claim on behalf of its personnel, as defined in Article 1 of the Safety Con-
vention and Article 26 of the UNIFIL SOFA.125 However, this raises similar 
concerns that were discussed in Section III(A). Israel may not be party to 
the Safety Convention because of its animosity toward UNIFIL. This further 
illustrates the need for imposing obligations on the international community 
as a whole with respect to the protection of peacekeepers.126
E. The Security Council
In a statement following the July 25 incident, the President of the Secu-
rity Council communicated the Council’s shock at the death of the four UN 
observers and concerns about the safety of UN personnel.127 The President 
stressed “that Israel and all concerned parties must comply fully with their 
obligations under international humanitarian law related to the protection of 
United Nations and its associated personnel and underline[d] the importance 
of ensuring that United Nations personnel are not the object of attack.”128
Yet, the Security Council did little to actually protect UN peacekeeping 
forces in South Lebanon.
Pursuant to the UN Charter, Member States are legally obligated to 
comply with Security Council decisions—that is, when the Security Council 
“decides” to take a certain course of action in a resolution, Member States 
must accept and carry out that decision.129 In contrast, when the Security 
122. This is not to say that Israel has no regard for maintaining a culture of accountabil-
ity in the IDF. Rather, it reflects the nature of Israel’s conflict with Lebanon.
123. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associat-
ed Personnel, adopted Dec. 8, 2005, 2689 U.N.T.S. 59.
124. See supra note 121.
125. “Military observers and civilian personnel other than United Nations officials . . .
shall be considered as experts on mission within the meaning of article VI of the [Privileges 
and Immunities] Convention.” Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Interim Force 
in Lebanon, supra note 88, art. 26.
126. See infra Section IV(C).
127. S.C. Pres. Statement 2006/34 (July 27, 2006).
128. Id.
129. U.N. Charter art. 25.
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Council uses language such as “calls upon” or “urges,” Member States are 
under no concrete obligation to comply. The Security Council’s resolutions 
on the situation in Lebanon demonstrate its lack of decisive action on the 
matter. For example, in Resolution 1697, following the deaths of the UN 
observers, the Council did not “decide” that Israel violated its obligation to 
ensure the safety of UNIFIL personnel or that Israel must abide by its inter-
national obligations and refrain from targeting peacekeepers. Instead, the 
Council
[u]rge[d] all concerned parties to abide scrupulously by their obli-
gation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations 
personnel, and avoid any course of action which might endanger 
United Nations personnel, and calls on them to allow the Force to 
resupply its positions, conduct search and rescue operations on be-
half of its personnel and undertake any other measures the Force 
deems necessary to ensure the safety of its personnel . . . .130
The Security Council decided to extend the mandate of UNIFIL and remain 
actively seized of the matter but did little to hold any party accountable for 
endangering and killing UNIFIL troops.131
The Security Council was apprised of the situation in Lebanon in 2006 
on a number of occasions throughout the conflict.132 UN documents demon-
strate that Member States raised concerns about the conflict frequently—
before and after the incident of July 25—and Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
himself addressed the Council about the death of the UN observers in 
Khiam and the ongoing risks UN peacekeepers were exposed to.133 Ghana, 
for example, raised concerns about the conditions imposed by Israel on 
UNIFIL and emphasized that Israel should ensure the safety and security of 
all UN personnel.134 Argentina emphasized the need to guarantee the safety 
and security of UNIFIL.135 India, a major troop contributor to UNIFIL and 
the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, expressed concerns 
about UNIFIL’s exposure to considerable risk and troops’ restricted move-
ment and stressed the sanctity of UN personnel.136 Tanzania noted that 
UNIFIL cannot carry out its mandate in the current operative circumstanc-
130. S.C. Res. 1697, ¶ 1 (July 31, 2006).
131. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
132. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5493d mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5493 (July 21, 
2006); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Inter-
im Force in Lebanon, U.N. Doc. S/2006/560 (July 21, 2006); U.N. Secretary-General, Report 
of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Resolution 1701 (2006), U.N. Doc. 
S/2006/670 (Aug. 18, 2006).
133. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated 29 July 2006 from the Secretary-General ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/595 (July 29, 2006).
134. U.N. SCOR, 5493d mtg., supra note 132, at 8.
135. Id. at 10.
136. Id. at 34.
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es.137 The United States was present at these meetings but refrained from 
making a statement.138
Secretary-General Annan, in a letter to the President of the Security 
Council following the incident in Khiam, reported that he was “disturbed to 
learn that the patrol base and its surroundings have come under renewed fir-
ing by IDF in the days following the incident of 25 July, which will un-
doubtedly have an effect on the investigation of the site that the United Na-
tions will need to undertake shortly.”139 Annan emphasized that UN 
peacekeepers not participating in an armed conflict are entitled to the same 
protections as civilians under IHL.140 In his 2006 report to the Security 
Council on UNIFIL, Annan indicated that several UNIFIL positions were 
hit by IDF fire and, in more than 48 instances, UNIFIL reported IDF fire 
close to its positions.141 The IDF also issued a warning that any person, in-
cluding UNIFIL personnel, approaching the Blue Line142 would be shot at.143
In the final hours of the 2006 war, UNIFIL reported that its personnel en-
dured 85 IDF-fired artillery shells and indicated that it strongly protested 
these attacks to the IDF at the time they occurred.144
There is certainly an argument to be made that the Security Council’s 
inaction in Lebanon may be a byproduct of the United States’ veto power. 
However, as demonstrated in the preceding sections,145 legal obligations to-
ward peacekeeping forces are unsettled. While political considerations ani-
mate the Security Council’s decisionmaking process, the unresolved status 
of peacekeepers in the international legal regime may inform the Council’s 
approach here as well. In the previously quoted passage from Resolution 
1697,146 the Security Council does not cite where the obligation to respect 
the safety of UN personnel stems from. Israel remains outside the scope of 
the Safety Convention, so perhaps the Council is alluding to IHL as the Sec-
retary-General did.
137. Id. at 5.
138. Id. at 1.
139. Letter dated 29 July 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, supra note 133.
140. Id.
141. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,
supra note 132, at ¶ 15.
142. The Blue Line is the de facto border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel. It 
was drawn following Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000. See UNIFIL Back-
ground, UNIFIL https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-background (last visited Mar. 28, 2019), 
for more information.
143. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,
supra note 132, ¶ 3.
144. Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Resolution 1701 (2006),
supra note 132, ¶ 9.
145. See, e.g., supra Section III(C).
146. See supra p. 25.
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The Council may avoid citing a certain body of law due to the unsettled 
nature of peacekeeper protections, or it may be that citing a body of law is 
not a common practice of the Council. Nevertheless, it would be helpful for 
the Council to state in no uncertain terms what exactly binds the parties to 
ensure the safety of UNIFIL troops. “Deciding” that a certain party is in vio-
lation of that obligation would also aid in holding responsible parties ac-
countable for violations of international law and establishing norms that re-
spect the sanctity of UN personnel. It may not be possible in this instance 
given the political context of UNIFIL, but the Security Council should be 
amenable to such an approach in other peacekeeping contexts.
IV.  Remnants of Solutions Past
Non-state actors, states parties to a conflict other than the host state, and 
inadequate or confused legal mechanisms often precipitate miscarriages of 
justice in peacekeeping missions and thwart the accomplishment of im-
portant mandates. The difficulty of bringing non-state actors into the ambit 
of legal instruments is certainly a shortcoming of the international legal 
framework, but it is difficult to bring states into the ambit of certain instru-
ments as well. Furthermore, the unresolved status of UN peacekeepers in 
some legal regimes compounds the problem of neighboring and/or belliger-
ent states outside the scope of important treaties and SOFAs. Worthy at-
tempts have been made to address some of these challenges, but the rise in 
peacekeeper fatalities suggests they are not enough. This Part analyzes the 
solutions offered by the report presented to the Secretary-General on im-
proving the security of peacekeepers and their applicability to UNIFIL. It 
also examines what remedies, if any, have been made available to peace-
keepers injured or killed in the line of service and their families.
A. Changing the Way the UN Does Business
A 2017 report commissioned by the Secretary-General on improving 
the security of UN peacekeepers describes the recent trend in peacekeeper 
fatalities as “beyond a normal or acceptable level of risk, and . . . likely to 
rise even higher.”147 The report attributes the increase in the deliberate tar-
geting of UN peacekeepers to the failure of the UN and Member States to 
adapt to the changing nature of peacekeeping and to take measures to oper-
ate more securely in these dangerous environments.148 The authors make a 
number of operational recommendations, including taking timely action in 
order to detect and mitigate threats.149 They also emphasize the importance 
of preserving the reputation of the UN and the need to pursue those who at-
tack UN personnel and bring them to justice; the UN must appear strong or 
147. CARLOS ALBERTO DOS SANTOS CRUZ, supra note 106.
148. Id. at 9.
149. Id. at 9–14.
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it will continue to be the target of attack.150 The report calls for greater use 
of force by UN peacekeepers in the face of attack as well.151
The report recommends the long-term solution of ensuring that attacks 
on peacekeepers are brought to the attention of the ICC.152 The Rome Stat-
ute of the ICC in fact classifies attacks against UN peacekeepers as a war 
crime in Article 8(2)(e)(iii):
For the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means: [O]ther serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not 
of an international character, within the established framework of 
international law, namely, any of the following acts: Intentionally 
directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or 
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping 
mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as 
long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civil-
ian objects under the international law of armed conflict . . . .153
However, not all countries—and, particularly, not all host states—are signa-
tories to the Rome Statute, including Lebanon and Israel.154 Accordingly, 
this solution does not provide much utility in the context of UNIFIL. This 
raises a question that remains unresolved: what is the appropriate venue for 
prosecuting those who target UNIFIL troops if the ICC is not available and 
Lebanon and Israel have maintained a state of war?
The report falls short with respect to the legal regimes applicable to UN 
peacekeepers as well. Discussion of the Rome Statute is insufficient. The 
significance of establishing legal norms cannot be discounted. The report 
does not call for universal ratification of the Safety Convention, which is 
arguably the most important regime applicable to peacekeepers, ensuring 
their protection and accountability for harm done to them.155 The report also 
does not account for the remaining legal regimes that apply to UN peace-
keepers and that may provide alternative remedies. While leadership, opera-
bility, training, and administration are critical components of a peacekeep-
ing force, the report should have paid greater attention to actors external to 
peacekeeping forces—for example, states—and their obligations to ensure 
the safety and security of UN personnel.
150. Id. at 12.
151. Id. at 10, 18.
152. Id. at 22.
153. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 104.
154. See supra Section III(C).
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B. Compensation and Deterrence
According to the UN Regulations for Field Manual Operations, a Mem-
ber State guilty of targeting peacekeepers will not be held liable.156 Indeed, 
the Regulations indicate that the UN itself is liable for injuries to its agents 
participating in peacekeeping missions.157 The UN has not accepted such li-
ability in the past, instead paying compensation to the injured agents or their 
families and simultaneously bringing a claim against the responsible Mem-
ber State as the Reparations case justifies.158 As discussed, however, the UN 
“has had almost no success in collecting damages for its injured agents from 
responsible States.”159 As such, pragmatism with respect to the viability of 
peacekeeping operations and a sense of justice have compelled the UN 
alone to pay compensation.160
The UN pays the families of soldiers killed while serving as UN peace-
keepers $70,000.161 This compensation comes from the UN peacekeeping 
budget.162 While compensating the families of victims is important, this ap-
proach does not realize the goal of criminal liability. Moreover, compensa-
tion by the UN does not achieve deterrence because the responsible party is 
not made to pay.163 The prospect of criminal liability as deterrence, however, 
is particularly implausible in the context of UNIFIL. It is unlikely that the 
UN will raise a claim against Israel on behalf of troops killed in its service. 
Furthermore, the families of UN peacekeepers have unsuccessfully attempt-
ed to hold Israel accountable for the deaths of their loved ones.164 At present, 
it does not appear feasible to accomplish compensation by means other than 
the current remedy in the context of UNIFIL, but the UN may take steps to 
alter this landscape over time.
156. Arsanjani, supra note 73, at 148.
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C. Moving Forward
Moving forward, a few avenues for arriving at greater compliance and 
deterrence are available to the UN. One viable way to pursue compliance 
and deterrence is for the Security Council to include language from the 
Safety Convention in resolutions establishing peacekeeping forces and 
providing for third-party facilitation of dispute resolution (where the Safety 
Convention falls short). This language should be included as a decision in 
order to vest it with the force of law. For extant peacekeeping missions, the 
Security Council should endeavor to impose similar obligations on the in-
ternational community as a whole. The Security Council has not shied away 
from legislating in this manner in the past. For example, Resolution 1373, 
issued in the aftermath of 9/11, and Resolution 1540, concerning disarma-
ment, establish “new rules of international law rather than issuing com-
mands to deal with a discrete conflict[.] [T]hey create obligations of a sort 
usually found only in treaties.”165 The Security Council should consider do-
ing the same to enhance peacekeeper protections.
The General Assembly should also be encouraged to include language 
from the Safety Convention in its resolutions for the purpose of creating soft 
law. Key provisions from the Safety Convention should be included in SO-
FAs, host country agreements, and the Secretary-General’s regulations for 
peacekeeping missions as well. While this approach may take longer to 
achieve a deterrent effect, its potential for establishing firm legal norms—
and perhaps even becoming custom—is hopeful. Moreover, it may pave the 
way for the Security Council and the international community to hold states 
responsible for violations of these provisions.
V.  Conclusion
The UN peacekeeping regime does not exist in a vacuum, insulated 
from legal frameworks and political considerations. Consequently, peace-
keeping forces established by the UN are confronted by a myriad of chal-
lenges. The case of UNIFIL illustrates the many complications that may 
characterize a peacekeeping operation and frustrate its mandate. This Note 
establishes that the UN must exert more effort to ensure that its peacekeep-
ers are protected in the dangerous corners of the globe to which they are de-
ployed. Although this Note does not endeavor to describe what an adequate 
legal architecture should look like, its illustration of the current architec-
ture’s shortcomings provides guidance for moving forward.
The UN may engage a number of means to enhance peacekeeper pro-
tections. Bolstering the Safety Convention and pursuing its widespread rati-
fication is one step. Concluding SOFAs with all parties to a conflict, not just 
the host state, is another. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary-
165. IAN JOHNSTONE, THE POWER OF DELIBERATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS 
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General for each peacekeeping mission should also incorporate the princi-
ples of the Safety Convention and include obligations for all parties to the 
conflict. Such regulations are likely to be considered mere soft law, but, in 
an ideal situation, they may eventually become customary international law.
The principles enshrined in the Safety Convention should be codified in 
the Security Council resolutions establishing peacekeeping forces so as to 
ensure the protection of these forces in the event that parties to a conflict are 
not parties to the Convention. The Security Council should also consider 
undertaking broader legislation efforts in this realm in order to enhance the 
international community’s obligations toward peacekeepers. Security Coun-
cil resolutions “deploring” and “condemning” attacks on peacekeepers must 
wield more legal substance and weight.  The Security Council’s role in 
maintaining international peace and security—and the peacekeeping mis-
sions that are corollaries of this responsibility—inevitably implicates poli-
tics and the controversy surrounding the Permanent Five’s power. The con-
figuration of the Security Council is unlikely to be reformed in the near 
future, but the UN may pursue other avenues to encourage the Council to 
ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers. Ultimately, the UN must do 
more to enforce its rights and to provide its personnel with the tools neces-
sary to secure their own rights.
